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ON THE UNCERTAINTy OF FUTUREPREFERENCES
iw H. S.\I/'tTSINIIA1JSEN
An often oterlooked diculty in long raitgt' planning is the likelihood that future preferences h' incompatible
with the initial ones, due to changs ofii political, psychological and sociological character. Under such
conditions, it is not clear what optimizationmeans. The usual procedure is to u.csumt' that the current
preferences iii!! remain in c'cr permanent ic. ibisamounts to the approximation of assumed certaiflt'-
equu alence for the problem in which optiniality is defined intCrm.s of future, not yet eacrly known,
preferences. Models of opinion eroiut ioncan he used to linprois' this approximation
1. INTROI)U(TION
The application of optimization theory requiresin most cases the consideration
of uncertainty. On one hand, realistic modelsof most systems are necessarily
stochastic, on the other hand there often isconsiderable uncertainty as to whether
the chosen model providesa sufficiently accurate representation of the relations
that exist in reality. This uncertainty appliesto the coefficients of the model as well
as to its structure,
However there is yet another factor that introducesuncertainty in dynamic
optimization when large spans of timeare involved. This is the uncertainty of
luture preferences, which seems to have beenlargely ignored.
When a model has been selected, the problemis to find an optimal policy
(feedback law). Within the model, uncertaintycan he thought of as the choice by
"nature" of an element of a set Q. The possible policies forma set F and the model
will define for each winandin F the resulting history of thesystem (say the
sequence of state and control variables). Thismay be thought of as a function
ii = S(w. '). Now, if we accept the axiomsof the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility theory, the preferences of the decisionmaker among the possible histories,
hence among the policies,can be represented by a utility function which assigns to
policy y a number
= E?{ U(h)} = U(S(w,
where P is the, possibly subjective, priorprobability distribution on C and U is the
utility function. The determination of U andP from interrogation of the decision
maker is not an easy matter but it has been the objectof much research [2] and will
be taken for granted here. What is done inessence is to formalize the mood of the
decision maker.
However, moods change. Theenergy policy of the United States is not judged
in 1973 by the same criteriaas would have been considered appropriate in 1953.
The weight given to environmental considerationshas definitely increased. It was
not possible to foresee with certainty in 1953 the extent of thisevolution nor can the
future evolution be predicted clearly today.However the 1953 decision maker
might (and we argue that he should) haveperceived the possibility of changes in
preference and this observation appliesto any long range planning. Taking the
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initial preference relationas absolute aridpernianeirt can lead toco which will he harshly judged ina later dimate.
This difficuhy has long beenperceived [3] but in carefultreatments ofdnapijc utility theory {IJ it is onlymentioned to be assumedaway.
2. Tiw PR0I)u.i
Consider the case ofa discrete time systemoperating over t0, i,.., T.A decision making (policy review)committee meets at eachperiod. At periodt preferences arc described by thepair(, U,). At best thissequence is a Stochastic process of known characteristicsFor instancc(pl],)niay hea knownfunction of the mood in, at timet and some social scientistmay have proposeda stochastic model for the evolution ofin,,which model weaccept. A few remarksare in order here to avoidconfusions(i) each pair (P,,U.) applies to the entire history,part of which will hepast history at timeI and part future. (ii) P, denotes thesubjective prior probabilityas judged at time. Of course the data availableat time I will lead toan updating of this priordistribution intoa posterior one by Bayes formula.However the verysame data will leadto different posterior distributions fordi9èrerit P,. (iii)t is not true ingeneral that aftersome time the influence ofthe prior distributionwill be washedout in the Bayesian updating for mild variationsin I. Indeed, P, isa joint distribtjtion forthe choices of nature at the initial,past and future times andsome of these choiceshave not even affected the systemyet at time t, andmay be nearly independentof the earlier choices. (iv) a variableprior distrihutioa isincluded onlybecause it couldoccur in reality. For all that followsone could restrict himselftothe case of fixedconstant P, and variable U,, allthe ditiiculties wouldpersist. The utility functionU, may have, forinstance, the formofan expectedinitial worth,
- E, {(exp A)J;r(xr,Ur)
where v,, u are thestochastic processesdepending on;' describing the state and control variables HereA,is the opinionat time I ofthe decision
making committee as to the properrate of discountingutility between timesr --I and r. For those financial problemswhere this discountingwould be given byan actual interest rate, there will beuncertainty only as to thefuture evolutionof this rate, i.e., for > t. In general,howeverAiris a subjectivequantity and even thepast values may be revisedas opinions change.
It is notgenerally mcaningftilto compare thevalues of ') forthe same) and two differentt, because theorigin and scaleof each utilityevaluation is arbitrary. However ratiossuch as {') -')]1 - E(;'0)j arc comparable fordifferent t and fixed;, )'o'i'i.
Ifa stochasticmodel for theevolution of(, U,)is acceptedthen for each, 1(y) becomesa randomprocess No totalordering of suchprocesses is agreed upon and thereforeit is not clearhow a policyis to beselected. If there isno Stochastic model forthe evolutionof theCommittee's opinion,this concltision is only reinforced.
92One could select any number of arbitrary procedures in order to arrive at a
decision. For instance onemay selectthepolicyy, to he uSed in period t, as a
function of the information available as to mood evolution, by a "superpolicy".
This information will consist at least of the past realizations of(., U,.). 1' and
in addition there may be sociological observables. The information about behavior
of the controlled system itself is already taken care of by the fact that ;' is a feedback
policy. The superpolicy might for instance be selected so as to maximize the
expectation of l'('), with respect to the stochastic model accepted for evolu-
tion of opinion. In this way, one obtains a stochastic control problem for an
enlarged system with a definite criterion. However the selection of the sum of the F,
is completely arbitrary and unsupported and depends on scaling at different
times.
Rather than trying to find some dogmatic recipe. it may be more enlightening
to describe what could actually occur.
3.THEASSUMEDPERMANENCE PROCEDURE
What may be happening in practice is that no overall preference ordering is
ever defined. Instead, a certain decision making procedure is followed, without
possibility of even speaking of optimality. The most likely procedure is to assume
at each time period that the current opinion is definitive and will no longer change.
Then at time 0, an (c)-optimal solution y° = ()'y?.....y.) is found for the
stochastic-control problem defined with (P0.U0)and ''is used. At time t. one
optimizes the future policy (, y......y.) so as to optimize the evaluation under
(P, U,)of the entire history of the system given the decisions made in the past.
Again y is used and the procedure repeated at t + 1. For simplicity it is assumed
that all past decisions and data are always available, that is, the classical informa-
tion pattern prevails.
The great practical advantage of assumed permanence is that no modeling of
opinion evolution is required.
The disadvantage is that early commitments may be made which are costly
to reverse if opinion changes so as to make them look disastrous. In practice the
decision maker may well reject an "optimal" solution and prefer one which is
inferior in the present preference ordering, because this other solution offers more
flexibility for later adjustment. This is nothing but a, perhaps intuitive, recognition
of the problem we are discussing.
4. THE HINDSIGHT CRITERION
From the point of view of stochastic control theory the assumed permanence
procedure is a suboptimal superpolicy, namely the certainty-equivalence policy for
the problem in which
the criterion isVT(y)
the "best estimate" of(PT,U)at time t is(P, U,).
In this view, it would be better to choose a superpolicy maximizing the expecta-
tion of VT('), which is possible in principle if a stochastic model for opinion evolu-
tion is available. The result would be to formally vindicate the intuitive feeling (of
93non-optiniality of assumed permanence) mentioned above. One may callthis
the hindsight criterion.
Does it make sense to base everything upon V1('')? One can only outlinewhat
kind of philosophy would justify it. Clearly, the committee is tryingto do the
"right thing" which is assumed to exist in some Platonic universe hut ofwhich
only imperfect knowledge is available. This knowledge is assumed to increasewith
time, due to the wisdom derived from experience. Of course that isan optimistic
assumption, which historians would accept only at best as a slight trendunder vast
fluctuations.
ItT is infinite, there may be difficulty in estimating V (y), a limit thatmight not
exist. It is more natural to fall back on a limited look-ahead procedure,namely to
select it at time £ as the initial portion of a policy' optimizing the expectation of
+'). Then again no overall preference ordering results, and theassumed
permanence procedure is included as a special ease for A = 0. The choiceof A
represents a compromise between shortsightedness and the extremeuncertainty of
the far future.
More generally A could depend on t(it might be the timeto the next election)
Or the criterion used could be a combination of the evaluationsat several future
time periods which may be indicated if thereare periodic phenomena in the model
of opinion evolution.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Optimization theory cannot entirely ignore theproblem of opinion evolution,
since this phenomenon is material inat least some of the problems to whichthe
theory is to be applied. What is required, isat least a rough model of opinion
evolution. Establishing such a model is outsidethe realm of control theory. Inits
simplest form, the utility function wouldcontain parameters whose evolutionis
described by a system of stochastic differenceequations.
Bell Labop-atorie.,
Murray Hill, New Jersey
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